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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
LECTURE SERIES*
THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE PRESIDENCY
Abe Fortas**
Although events affecting the Nixon Presidency have intervened since
Justice Fortas delivered this lecture on April 18, 1974, his basic thesis
about the Presidency transcends recent events.
The American Presidency,' like slavery, is a peculiar institution.
Many of our Chief Executives have sometimes felt that the Presidency
is in fact a form of slavery. But they seem to resist emancipation; and
most of them exercise considerable ingenuity to avoid being relieved
of their splendid misery. The job has its compensations. Its trappings
are regal; its fringe benefits are sumptuous; and the power which is
attendant upon it is overwhelming. The President's finger can put vast
events in motion-not just the firing of the nuclear bomb.
The Presidency has become the central, dominating factor in our
collective lives, and a crucial factor in the world.
The Presidency does not induce humility. The President is coddled,
cuddled and sheltered--even while he is denounced and abused. But
he is still just a man: a fallible human being. His exalted position and
his vast power constantly remind him that he has a great mission; and
the splendid unreality of the White House residence, the airplanes,
secret service agents and body servants-the retinue and trappings of
* The Washington Law Review Lecture Series, initiated this year, is designed to
bring outstanding speakers to the law school to discuss contemporary legal issues. The
Review wishes to acknowledge the generous financial assistance of the University of
Washington Law School Foundation in initiating this series.
** Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 1965-69; A.B., Southwestern College,
1930; LL.B., Yale, 1933.
1. In the studies preliminary to preparation of this paper, I have particularly appre-
ciated ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (hereinafter cited as
SCHLESINGER); EMMET HUGHES, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY (1973); RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973) (hereinafter cited as BERGER);
and CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1960) (hereinafter cited as Ros-
SITER).
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the office-constantly tell him that he is a chosen man, that he is
uniquely endowed with wisdom and genius to determine the Nation's
course.
His life is sheltered: He is criticized in public, sometimes viciously,
but never to his face. In his presence, he is treated with reverence: He
is never Harry or Lyndon or Dick. He is always "Mr. President."
To most Presidents, public criticism and the frustrations of our
system are healthy reminders of their fallibility; but sometimes, and to
some Presidents, they are incitements to use the enormous power of
the office to punish in retaliation: To such Presidents, criticism is an un-
bearable interference with the great mission of the Presidency as they
see it.
I. A FETTERED PRESIDENCY
The Framers of the Constitution tried to design a modest Presi-
dency. They foresaw the danger of an Imperial Presidency, in Arthur
Schlesinger's phrase. 2 They realized that the Presidency was capable
of misuse and abuse: that it could be used to invade the constitutional
liberties of private citizens; to weaken and enfeeble opposing political
parties by illegal means; to operate secretly; to avoid accountability;
and to circumvent and enfeeble the other institutions of government.
We know now that their fears were justified.
The group of astonishing young men whom we call the Founding
Fathers sought to devise a system that would not permit a runaway
Presidency. They feared the corruption of power. They distrusted
kings and Presidents. They distrusted legislatures3 and they even dis-
trusted the people themselves. As George Washington phrased it, they
wondered whether "mankind when left to themselves are unfit for
their own government."'4
But they had reluctantly concluded that a strong central govern-
ment was essential. They had learned, from their distressing experi-
ence under the Articles of Confederation, that feeble government was
no government, and that no government meant chaos. They had
learned that people need the restraining hand of government-just as
2. SCHLESINGER.
3. See BERGER at 100: "It is true that the Framers had come to fear legislative
excesses as a result of the states' post- 1776 experience ... "
4. ROSSITER at 112.
988
Vol. 49: 987, 1974
The Constitution and the Presidency
government requires the restraining hand of the people. They had not
abandoned the revolutionists' exalted faith in the divine nature of
man; but they had learned that man's divinity was still a seed which
needed the help of an effective government.
So it was that in 1787, when the delegates to the constitutional
convention met, they tried to create a government in which power
would exist, but always in check. They devised a powerful govern-
ment, but they fragmented its power. They built conffict and tension
into the system that they created. No one-no official or branch of
government-was given authority independent of the authority of
others. No one was given power to decree. Their guiding principle was
not efficiency, but advocacy and persuasion. The President could
advocate and propose, and he could execute the laws, but he could
not legislate. The Congress could legislate, but unless it could per-
suade the President or override him, it was subject to the President's
veto power. And the Supreme Court could checkmate both of them.
Even this was not enough: They did not merely fragment power in
three parts. They created not just a tripartite government, but a plur-
alistic political system. The checks and balances were not confined to
the three estates of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. The ar-
chitects of our Constitution decreed a fourth estate, the press, and a
fifth estate, the people; and to both of these, they guaranteed rights to
affect and even determine the course of government-rights which
were placed beyond the reach of government. And they also carved
out of the domain of government a sixth estate, untouchable by gov-
ernment or by a majority of the people: This was each person's fealty
or nonfealty to God and to the institutions of religion. They knew
that man's inner commitment and the vastly important establishments
of the various faiths are the bedrock of political democracy because
they are the ultimate-the irreducible essence-of personal freedom.
They knew that no government could achieve absolute authority if the
conscience of the people is free.
By the first amendment, guaranteeing individual liberty and
freedom, of the press and religion, the Founding Fathers sought to
serve more than the cause of personal liberty. The first ameidment is
more than a charter of individual freedom; it is a fundamental polit-
ical principle. It is the fundamental institution of political government
in a democracy. A free people-and only a free people-protected in
their persons, their conscience, their speech, their rights to act jointly,
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and secure in their homes and offices, can effectively preserve a polit-
ical democracy.
A management consultant, looking at the product of the Founding
Fathers, would almost certainly have said that it could not possibly
work. A realistic chart of the governmental system they created would
look more like a hopeless maze, bound to frustrate the emergence of
decision, than an orderly structure. But the remarkable fact is that this
system, defying all management principles, has survived for about 200
years. Its longevity is unparalleled. No other nation has been governed
for so long a period under a continuous written charter.
Our Constitution has survived because it is essentially and realisti-
cally a human document. It has survived because of, and not in spite
of, its ambiguities and its managerial imperfections-because it is
peculiarly adapted to the American character and to our institutions,
of which it is both parent and child. A more perfect Constitution-
efficiently designed, and free of the ambiguities and conflicts of our
charter-would long ago have been shattered by the pressures and
demands of the spectacular growth of our nation and the aggressive-
ness of its people.
But the very characteristics which made our Constitution viable
were themselves the source of danger. The ambiguities of our Consti-
tution are essential to its vitality; but an ambiguous charter is a temp-
tation to the ambitious. The fragmentation of power in our Constitu-
tion is essential to its democratic design; but fragmentation of power
carries with it conflict, confrontation and frustration; and the combi-
nation of power and frustration is hard for some leaders to accept. To
some men in the Presidential chair, our system is a cage preventing
them from accomplishing their herculean task; the peril that a Presi-
dent may seek to break through the bars of the cage is ever present.
The Founding Fathers realized this danger. They were acutely
aware that Presidents might seek to breach the limitations upon their
power. So it was, according to legend, that when Benjamin Franklin
returned to his lodging from the constitutional convention, he was
asked by his landlady: "Mr. Franklin, what have you given us, a re-
public or a monarchy?" And he replied, "A republic-if you can keep
it.",5
5. M. CUNLIFFE, et al., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 24
(1968).
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That is still our challenge, dramatized by the events of the past few
years.
II. PRESIDENTIAL EXPANSION WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTION
Despite their misgivings, the drafters of the Constitution concluded
-and wisely-that they had no alternative, that a strong Presidential
office is essential to effective government.6
They resolved that the President was to be the only "National Offi-
cer"-the only chosen official, along with his Vice President, repre-
senting the Nation as a whole. As Gouverneur Morris stated it, he was
to be the only "National Officer, acting for and equally sympathizing
with every part of the United States."'7
The President was to be the Chief Executive of the government-
the sole and ultimate repository of power to carry out the laws of the
United States.8
He was to be the supreme military commander: Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.9
He was vested with the power to conduct our foreign affairs. 10
He was given a legislative function: He must report to Congress on
the State of the Union, and recommend measures for their considera-
tion." He may veto bills passed by the Congress, in which event they
do not become law unless passed over his veto by two-thirds of each
House.12 He may convene Congress and, in certain circumstances,
adjourn them.'3
He was given a vital role with respect to the Judiciary: He appoints
Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the other federal courts,
with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 4
These are great powers, but they are incomplete. The President has
power to administer, to initiate, to lead and to advocate. He can shape
6. 1 believe this characterization is justified despite the wide spectrum of opinion
among the drafters. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
7. M. CUNLIFFE, etal., supra note 4, at 38.
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
9. Id.§ 2.
10. Id.
II. Id. § 3.
12. Id. art. I, § 7.
13. Id. art. II, § 3.
14. Id.§ 2.
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events which determine the fate of the Nation. As Chief Executive and
political leader, he has unique opportunity to summon the people to
his support, to reward those who aid him and to punish his opposi-
tion.
But the ultimate power to make the rules, to legislate, is not the
President's; it is the Legislature's. Our Constitution creates a President
with formidable governmental power, but it does not authorize him to
govern. The President is a part of the government; he is not the gov-
ernment.
There have been many instances in our history, dating from the
earliest days of the Republic, when Presidents have taken action
which was not authorized by the Congress, and which was, in greater
or less degree, beyond the President's unilateral power. With few ex-
ceptions, these instances have been related to armed conflict and for-
eign affairs. 15 They have stemmed from the premise, which I believe
to be erroneous, but which many Presidents have adopted, that the
President, particularly as Commander-in-Chief, has implied and vir-
tually unlimited emergency powers.
Even Lincoln and Truman, both of whom were sensitive to the
meaning and genius of our Constitution, were guilty of exceeding
their constitutional powers. Truman seized the steel mills in order to
prevent interruption of production which might jeopardize conduct of
the Korean War. Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus during
the Civil War. Both Presidents rationalized their acts by the claim, as
Truman stated it, that "The President of the United States has very
great inherent powers to meet great national emergencies."' 16 The Su-
preme Court held that both of them had acted unconstitutionally. 17
In considering the constitutional derelictions of past Presidents,
however, it is important to realize that, without exception, their un-
constitutional actions have been specific and isolated-taken to meet
specific and emergency situations. Their derelictions have not chal-
lenged or implicated the basic constitutional structure of our govern-
15. "The Imperial Presidency was essentially the creation of foreign policy."
SCHLESINGER at 208 and passim.
16. Id. at 142.
17. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866): Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Milligan was the occasion for Justice Davis' famous
statement: "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people.
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21.
992
Vol. 49: 987, 1974
The Constitution and the Presidency
ment. They have not been part of a general course of action in the
day-to-day conduct of government. They have not been based upon,
nor have they constituted an assertion of general Presidential power to
override the authority of Congress or to disregard the law. Presidents
have not sought to prevent examination of their acts, or to avoid re-
sponsibility for them. They have not claimed that "executive privi-
lege" 18 confers upon the President total immunity from legal process
and absolute, comprehensive and exclusive authority to decide what
he will and will not disclose in response to congressional demand or
other lawful authority.
Obviously, most Presidents, under the pressure of events, have
sometimes wished that our system was different. Every President is
certain that he could do better if it were not for the Congress and the
press, and sometimes, the Supreme Court. In the past, they have nev-
ertheless endured the frustrations of the system; and within that sys-
tem, some of them have nevertheless achieved greatness. Strong Presi-
dents have found within the President's constitutional power the po-
tential for powerful, daring, innovative action; but, with relatively few
lapses,19 they have done so by providing leadership and advocacy and
by using the office to obtain the consensus that our Constitution re-
quires.
The outstanding exemplar of this was Franklin Roosevelt. During
his incumbency, Presidential power expanded to an unprecedented
degree; but the expansion occurred despite, and not because of his
abortive and unfortunate attempt to weaken the institution of the Su-
preme Court. It was the result of constitutional processes. The explo-
sive increase of Presidential function and prerogative which revolu-
tionized the Presidency was the product of congressional legislation,
enacted under Roosevelt's extraordinary leadership. It was not a con-
sequence of unilateral action, of the seizure of power.
Roosevelt deployed the tensions and conflicts built into our Consti-
tution to achieve affirmative action within the system. Faced by a cat-
astrophic depression and a World War, he sought and obtained from
the Congress great and novel authority for the President to act. But he
did not usurp the power of the Congress or invade the rights of the
18. See Goldberg, The Constitutional Limitations on the President's Powers,
22 AM. U.L. REV. 667 (1973).
19. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
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people or the press or even of the opposing political party in order to
accomplish the vast programs that he initiated.2 0
III. AN ATTEMPTED CONSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT
This sort of expansion of executive power has not been the method
of the Nixon administration. Like all strong Presidents, President
Nixon has sought to have the nation follow his leadership and accept
his decisions. But his conception of the Presidency is radically dif-
ferent from that of his predecessors. It represents a sharp break with
our history and constitutional tradition. The Nixon administration has
challenged our constitutional institutions. It has not merely committed
acts in excess of constitutional right and authority. It has boldly con-
fronted us with a new and revolutionary concept of the Presidency.
President Nixon obviously believed that he had authority to im-
pound funds appropriated by the Congress, and he did so. 21 He be-
lieved that he could refuse to carry out prograp enacted by the Con-
gress, and he did so. He claimed broad and final authority to withhold
information from the Congress and to avoid accountability for his ac-
tions. Members of his staff, seeking to accomplish Presidential pur-
poses, have used the powers of the Presidential office to plan or au-
thorize fantastic acts of lawlessness, violating ancient and funda-
mental rights of the people.
He has presented us with a challenge to our Constitution-to our
basic institutions and our way of life. However well-motivated the
President may be, or however unaware he may be of the implications
of his actions, the net effect of his actions has been an attempted con-
stitutional coup d'etat: A fundamental alteration-a subversion-of
our basic constitutional structure.
Thus, we are confronted with a constitutional crisis. The signifi-
cance of this crisis does not stem from the incredible acts of alleged
criminal or quasi-criminal conduct that have been the subject of mas-
sive investigation. These are merely the ugly manifestations of a con-
ception of Presidential power and status which has no place in our
constitutional system.
20. See SCHLESINGER 105-09.
21. See Comment, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional
Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636 (1973).
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The alleged criminal acts are, of course, of great national concern.
They include charges to which the administration's former Attorney
General vividly referred as "horrors":22 Alleged complicity in bur-
glary, unlawful electronic espionage, concealment of felonies, obstruc-
tion of justice, unlawful suppression and withholding of evidence.
I hope that the President's personal involvement in respect of these
charges can be disproved. But the fact remains that if and when sub-
stantial allegations of misfeasance are made against a President, our
system of government requires that the President respond to the alle-
gations, like any other person so accused.2 3
Our Constitution does not give a President or his staff authority to
participate in or to authorize criminal acts. Certainly it would be pre-
posterous to argue that a President or his staff may engage in unlawful
conduct in order that he may be re-elected. As a candidate for
re-election, he has no more rights than his rivals. But even as to acts
related to the conduct of his office, the President and his staff are sub-
ject to the law, including the prohibitions of the criminal code. Nor
does our Constitution confer immunity upon a President or his staff
for the consequences of their acts, or a right to withhold relevant evi-
dence.
A President is accountable for criminal acts, if he has committed
them, like any other citizen. He may be removed from office. 24 He
may be prosecuted after impeachment and removal from office;25 and,
in theory, nothing in the Constitution itself would bar indictment and
prosecution even while he is in office-unwise and infeasible as this
may be in practice. There is no constitutional difference in this respect
between a President or Vice President, a federal judge or any other
civil officer of the United State 26-despite assertions to the contrary.
22. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of
the U.S. Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Phase I, Book 4, at 1625 (1973) (testimony of
Mr. Mitchell).
23. "Though the President is elected by nationwide ballot, and is often said to rep-
resent all the people, he does not embody the nation's sovereignty. He is not above the
law's commands." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,711 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
25. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
26. See the remarks of Raoul Berger: "The Constitution says they're all on a par
[judges and the President]. . . . They can all be indicted without being impeached."
Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1973, § A, at 12, col. 1. See also Bestor, Book Review, 49
WASH. L. REv. 255, 271-74 (1973); Berger, Impeachment: A Countercritique, 49
WASH. L. REV. 845 (1974).
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But we shall be derelict in our duty if our response to the present
crisis is merely punishment of the malefactors-if we neglect the un-
derlying meaning and moral of the traumatic experience which we are
enduring. The events of the past few years teach a lesson which we
will ignore only at our great peril. They teach us the terrible conse-
quences which can result from the exercise of unbridled power: That
power exercised without constitutional restraint can destroy not only
our democratic political system, but our personal, individual liberty.
Some of the criminal acts in which the Nixon administration was
allegedly implicated involved violations of ancient and fundamental
rights, enshrined in our constitutional guaranties: The right to pri-
vacy, to security of our homes and offices, to freedom from lawless
action under cloak of governmental authority. It is not mere coinci-
dence that these spectacular charges of criminal and unconstitutional
invasion of the rights of individuals have been lodged against a White
House which is also accused of disregarding the limitations of Presi-
dential authority in governmental affairs: of disregarding congres-
sional commands with respect to Cambodia and Laos, of unlawfully
impounding appropriated funds and of refusing to implement pro-
grams enacted by the Congress.
The same inflated conception of Presidential power and immunity
which provided the basis for Watergate and the other "horrors" also
led to the exercise by the President of governmental power which our
Constitution denies to him. All of these acts and events are the
product of a conception and theory of the Presidency as an office with
power to disregard the law to achieve Presidential objectives, with
power to make law, rather than execute it, and with power to refuse to
account for Presidential acts.
The history of political institutions warns us that the destruction of
restraints upon political power and the destruction of individual lib-
erty go hand in hand. Regimes that seize political power preserve and
expand that power by the ruthless and lawless invasion of personal
rights. Let us not delude ourselves into believing that we are immune,
that we can tolerate the violation of the political restraints which our
Constitution places upon the Presidency and nevertheless remain
complacently secure that we retain our cherished freedoms.
We will not solve our problems merely by punishing those guilty of
criminal acts. We will not save our nation merely by rebuffing this
Administration's attempt to exercise unconstitutional authority. We
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must ponder the fundamental problem of which we are now so dra-
matically warned: The problem of the adequacy and effectiveness of
our machinery to restrain the Presidency.
We have experienced the incredible. The unprecedented, the un-
thinkable, have happened. They can happen again; and it is not in-
conceivable that if they occur again-if we fail to take measures to
prevent their recurrence-the next time they will succeed. If they suc-
ceed, virtually unlimited Presidential power may replace our political
democracy and undermine our personal liberty and our freedom from
arbitrary, lawless governmental action.
We must, therefore, consider the following questions: Are our con-
stitutional institutions adequate to confine the President's actions to
the limits necessary for democratic government and to protect each of
us against misuse of Presidential power; is our constitutional machi-
nery adequate to make the President properly accountable for his
acts; have the changes wrought by time and events, and the evolution
of the power of the President, so enfeebled the checks and balances
provided by our Constitution that fundamental revisions are essential?
In short, we must address ourselves to an examination of the ade-
quacy of our machinery to protect the rights of the people and their
institutions-the Congress, the press and our political system-
against Presidential usurpation and abuse; to establishing proper and
workable definitions for Presidential authority; and to creating effec-
tive machinery to ensure Presidential accountability for the President's
actions.
IV. A REEXAMINATION OF THE PRESIDENCY
I should like, first, to clear away some of the dust that has recently
been kicked up, by stating a few elementary principles:
1. The President is not above the law. He is subject to the Consti-
tution and the laws enacted by the Congress-in all respects, not just
some.
2. It is the President's constitutional duty to execute, to apply and to
administer the laws duly enacted by the Congress, whether they are
good, bad or indifferent, and whether they will balance the budget or
break it. He cannot constitutionally impound funds which Congress
has appropriated and directed him to spend, unless and except to the
extent that Congress has authorized him to do so. He cannot refuse to
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carry out programs which Congress has enacted, whether they relate
to minority employment opportunities or to the sewage and water sys-
tems of our Nation. 27
3. The President cannot constitutionally, even for a moment of
time, authorize lawless programs of domestic surveillance, wiretap-
ping, electronic espionage, or breaking and entering homes or offices,
whether in the interests of internal security or otherwise. He can nei-
ther do these things, nor authorize or permit them to be done.28 It is
his duty to prevent any such acts, and to see that the perpetrators are
prosecuted.
4. The President and the entire executive establishment must ac-
count to the Congress for their actions and, with extremely limited
exceptions, must respond to authorized congressional, judicial and
grand jury demands for relevant material and information, including
memoranda and even tape recordings. 29 Our system does not recog-
nize a general, royal or presidential prerogative incident to Presiden-
tial tapes or papers or communications, or to the person occupying
the Presidency. "Executive privilege" is nothing more or less than the
principle that, in limited situations, the courts will permit the Presi-
dent or a principal executive officer to decline to comply with sub-
poenas or congressional demands for his physical presence30 or for the
27. See Comment, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congres-
sional Power, 82 YALE L.J. 1636 (1973).
28. Cf. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
29. Cf. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); Kra-
mer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study ofthe Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 623 & 827 (1961) (two parts).
30. But the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 687 (1972), dealing
with a grand jury subpoena directed to a newspaperman, includes the following foot-
note:
Jeremy Bentham vividly illustrated this maxim [that the public has a right to
every person's evidence]:
"Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in office-men
whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves-are such men to
be forced to quit their business, their functions, and what is more than all, their
pleasure, at the beck of every idle or malicious adversary, to dance attendance
upon every petty cause? Yes, as far as it is necessary. they and everybody. ...
Were the Prince o Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury. and the Lord High
Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a
barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chim-
ney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them
for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly." 4 The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 320-321 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
In United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. pp. 30. 34 (No. 14.692d) (C.C.Va. 1807).
Chief Justice Marshall. sitting on Circuit, opined that in proper circumstances a
subpoena could be issued to the President of the United States.
408 U.S. at 688-89 n. 26.
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disclosure of certain restricted and reasonably well-identifiable types
of documents or communications. This is not because of any explicit
provision in the Constitution.3' The Constitution says nothing about
executive privilege; but the courts will recognize such a privilege,
where and to the extent that it is a necessary incident to the perform-
ance of official duties, and where the recognition of the privilege is
necessary to serve the national interest. In making these judgments,
the courts will also take into account the reasons for the demand for
disclosure, the purpose which disclosure would serve, and the materi-
ality and importance of disclosure to the issues before Congress or the
courts.
Executive privilege will almost always be recognized by the courts
where and to the extent that the subpoenaed material contains secret
and sensitive defense or foreign affairs information. 32 On the other
hand, a claim of privilege by the President will not be sustained if the
communication does not directly relate to his official duties, if it is
otherwise material to the matter at issue.33 This is true with respect to
verbal as well as written or recorded communications between the
President and his staff, or other persons. There is no basis, therefore,
for a claim of executive privilege with respect to communications re-
lating to such acts as campaign activities or actions which may violate
the criminal laws. Even communications between the President and
his personal lawyer are not privileged if they involve a conspiracy to
commit a violation of law or to conceal a felony.
Obviously, this doctrine, correctly understood, refutes the claim
that the President may himself finally decide whether or not he will
produce evidence. The power to decide whether the President must or
need not comply is in the courts; the President may claim the right to
decline to comply; but only the courts can decide the question. 34 Ob-
viously, the doctrine provides no basis for a claim of privilege by the
President with respect to documents or tapes relating to the Presi-
dent's political activities or to any matter except those incident to his
lawful, official duties, disclosure of which would be injurious to the
31. "The Constitution makes no mention of special presidential immunities."
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
32. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, at 6-7, 11 (1953).
33. Cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
34. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 792-94(D.C. Cir. 1971); 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379, at 809-10 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
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Nation or would hamper the President in the performance of his con-
stitutional and lawful functions.3 5
Lawyers will recognize that the doctrine is not essentially different
from the principles that govern decisions with respect to private citi-
zens.36 The basic principles are the same: Disclosure is required only
where the communication is material to the issue at hand; but where it
is material, claims of privilege must be decided on the basis of the
subject matter of the communication-not the status of the participants.
The difference between the treatment of the President and a private
citizen is merely the consequence of the Executive's special constitu-
tional and official duties.
This is fundamental to our democratic, constitutional system. The
President of the United States is not above the law. He is subject to
the law, like any other person; and he can claim only such immunity,
such privilege, as is given to him by express legislation or by the appli-
cation of universal legal principles incident to his particular role and
responsibilities.
5. Under our Constitution, the President has no implied powers
which enable him to make or disregard laws, except as specifically
authorized by the Congress. The President has certain emergency
powers, derived from his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, but these powers are extremely limited. They do not authorize
him to suspend or disregard laws, or to invade the constitutional rights
of citizens, even when internal security is involved.37 The President's
powers as Commander-in-Chief are military, not legislative. He is the
supreme civilian head of the Armed Forces. He controls their use and
deployment, subject, however, like any other commander of military
forces, to law and to congressional authorization. Like a field com-
mander, he can take military action to meet an emergency, if such ac-
tion is limited to the emergency; but it is the right and duty of the
Congress, which it has sometimes cravenly avoided performing, to
enact legislation, as promptly as possible, to direct that the military
action continue or be terminated. The President, whether as Com-
mander-in-Chief or otherwise, has no constitutional authority to use
armed forces contrary to law and to congressional direction.
35. Cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
36. United States v. Burr. 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692) (C.C. Va. 1807): Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
37. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
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6. With respect to foreign affairs, the drafters of the Constitution
understood that the President's role would, of necessity, be primary.
The authority to deal with foreign governments had to be vested in an
individual, not in the Congress; the drafters hoped that adequate
checks upon Presidential power would be provided by the necessity of
obtaining the Senate's advice and consent to treaties38 and the exclu-
sive power of Congress to declare war.39 But the tidy, formal world
that this arrangement postulated has long since vanished. Relations
with foreign governments defy the neat constitutional categories. Wars
are seldom declared; they develop and exist. International commit-
ments are made without the formality of treaties. These commitments
sometimes, in practical effect, inextricably involve the Nation in alli-
ances of vast consequences, even leading to war. Presidents, some-
times unavoidably, present the Congress and the people with a fait
accompli. A President can, for example, by diplomatic moves, create
a situation of d6tente with the Soviet Union and China, in which Con-
gress had no participation. Congress can decline to enact the measures
to implement Presidential commitments, but often this is Hobson's
choice-more theoretical than real.
As we saw in the Vietnam and Korean conflicts, a President can
even commit the Nation to a course of action that, step by step, leads
to major armed conflict far from our shores. Presidents Eisenhower
and Kennedy began our Vietnam involvement by assigning "military
advisers" to South Vietnam. They could perhaps justify this as part of
their diplomatic function, as part of foreign intelligence gathering, or
as an adjunct to military aid and the supply of weapons, authorized by
the Congress. But as we have experienced, it is a dangerous process-
simple to commence, difficult to limit, and hard to terminate.
7. As Chief Executive, the President is the head of the entire exec-
utive establishment of the United States. The departments are created
by law of the Congress; the Congress defines their jurisdiction, duty,
power and, within constitutional limits, their procedures; and they
must render an accounting to the Congress for their administration.
But Congress has no power to remove an executive officer from his
position, even by the indirect means of using its appropriation power,
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
39. Id. art. I, § 8.
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except by the process of impeachment 40 under exactly the same con-
stitutional provision and procedure that applies to the President and
Vice President.
Accordingly, the ultimate responsibility for the quality of the vast
federal bureaucracy-except as to the quasi-judicial agencies 41-is in
the President. His power, however, is limited by the terms of the legis-
lation which an executive agency is administering. If the legislation
places the authority to act in a particular agency or agency head,
the President cannot supplant the agency and himself make the judg-
ments. He may, and in a sense, he must, advise the head of the agency
and oversee its work, but he cannot himself exercise power which
Congress has vested elsewhere. Except in the case of quasi-judicial
officials and agencies, he may remove an agency head whom he has
appointed if he disagrees with him, and appoint more cooperative
personnel. The President may not, however, himself take over the
function or transfer it to another department, or create an agency or
group to perform the function, because Congress has authorized the
department, and not the President, to do so. In short, the President
has the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, but he
can bear this responsibility only within the terms and through the
officials and agencies prescribed by the Congress. He cannot take
over the powers of an agency without congressional authorization.
An illustration of violation of this principle is presented by the
creation in the White House of the so-called Plumbers and the
attempt to invest them with authority which, if it existed anywhere, was
in the FBI-certainly not in the White House. The President has auth-
ority and flexibility within the discretionary appropriation to him, to
create a White House staff, but the functions of that staff are limited
by the limitations of Presidential authority. They are to aid him in
performance of his duties. They cannot be authorized to perform func-
tions which the Congress has vested in another department or agency
of the government.
V. PRESIDENTIAL RESTRAINT: INHERENT DEFECTS
As we consider and evaluate the complexities and problems of the
Nation today, it seems beyond dispute that we need, we must have, a
40. United States v. Lovett. 328 U.S. 303 (1946): see also Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
4 1. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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strong Presidency. We must have a Presidency that has the power and
status to lead the Nation, to speak effectively for us in the complex,
difficult and dangerous area of relations with other nations, and to
oversee effectively the enormous federal establishment. The President
must be equipped with adequate powers to discharge these duties. To
the extent that he does not have them by specific constitutional grant
or existing legislation, Congress should enact new laws, carefully de-
signed so as to subject the President to appropriate congressional con-
trols. We should neither deny to the President the authority that he
needs to do his job, nor should we, by failing to give him that author-
ity, tempt him to exceed his constitutional powers.
But the Presidency must be controlled and restrained. We need re-
straints upon the President commensurate with the greatness of his
powers and the potential of his office for expansion and misuse of
these powers. The events of the past few years warn us that we cannot
rely merely upon the self-restraint of the man who is President, or
upon his sensitivity to the meaning and message of our constitutional
system.
The controls that the Founding Fathers adopted are no longer ade-
quate. The balance that the Founding Fathers ingeniously devised no
longer exists. It has been destroyed by the complexities of modern life,
the vast expansion of governmental function, the decline of Congress
due to the growth in the number of its members and, principally, to its
failure effectively to reorganize its management and procedures, and
by the enormous increase in Presidential power and prestige. At the
same time, we have adopted Constitutional amendments which have
enfeebled the checks, the restraints, upon the President in which the
drafters of the Constitution placed their ultimate reliance.
The primary check upon the President upon which the Founding
Fathers relied was the power of the people to elect and reelect him, if
they so decided. They believed that Presidents would seek to conduct
themselves so as to win the favor of the people in order to assure
reelection. If a President should die, resign or be removed from office
prior to expiration of his term, the people's second choice for that
great office-the Vice President-would succeed him. But both of
these features of our constitutional system have been eroded. A Presi-
dent, in his second term, is no longer influenced by the possibility that
he may decide or be called upon to stand for reelection. This change
came about in 1951, when, in reaction to FDR's long tenure, we
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adopted the twenty-second amendment to the Constitution, limiting
the President to two terms. To some Presidents, this limitation can be
an incitement to extreme action. In his second term, a President is
admonished that, by law, this is his last chance to reshape the Nation
in his own image. He sees the end of the road, and to a hard-driving
man of vast ambition, the prospect of an incomplete mission may not
be endurable. He believes that he knows what should be done; and he
is immune from the restraining effect of the possibility that he may de-
cide to run for reelection and that, if his program is not acceptable to
the people, they may repudiate him at the polls. In our history, every
President except Franklin D. Roosevelt has observed the tradition lim-
iting a President to two terms; but until the adoption of the
twenty-second amendment, the possibility, however theoretical, of
another term has been a seasoning ingredient in Presidential psy-
chology. Without the twenty-second amendment, the decision whether
to run for a third term would most likely not be made until late in the
second term, human nature and politics being what they are, and the
possibility of another term thus would act as a restraint until that time.
The power of the people has also been diminished by changes in
the manner of selecting the Vice President. Initially, the Vice Presi-
dent was the candidate for President who received the second-largest
number of electoral votes. In 1804, we adopted the twelfth amend-
ment which provided that the Vice President would be separately
nominated and elected. Inevitably, this led to the present situation in
which Vice Presidents are not, in fact, nominated or elected by the
voters, but are designated by the Presidential nominees and elected as
an appendage to the successful Presidential candidate. The result is
that if a President dies, resigns or is removed from office, he is suc-
ceeded by a person who, realistically, is not the selection of the peo-
ple, but the choice-usually for political or ticket-balancing reasons
-of his predecessor. In 1967, we compounded this by ratification of
the twenty-fifth amendment which includes a provision authorizing
the President to fill a vacancy in the office of Vice President, with the
concurrence of a simple majority of each House of the Congress.
Both of these amendments-the twenty-second, limiting the Presi-
dent to two terms in office, and those provisions of the twenty-fifth
providing for Presidential designation of a Vice President to fill a va-
cancy in that office-have some merit, but on balance, I believe they
were unfortunate. The fact-the important fact-is that both represent
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a dilution of a fundamental part of the design of our Constitution: The
power of the people, by their vote, to choose their President and the
restraint which this reference to the people was designed to exercise upon
the behavior of their Chief Executive.
The second and ultimate restraint which the Founding Fathers built
into the Constitution was a mechanism for removal of a President
prior to the expiration of his term. This mechanism was the formidable
weapon of impeachment. The architects of the Constitution provided
that the President, Vice President and any civil officer of the United
States could be removed from office upon impeachment by majority
vote of the House of Representatives and conviction by two-thirds of
the members of the Senate present. 42 Upon conviction, not only is the
President removed from office, but he may not thereafter hold any of-
fice of honor, trust or profit under the United States; and he is subject
to indictment and prosecution for any criminal offenses he may have
committed. 43
Let me make a preliminary point about the impeachment provi-
sions of the Constitution. A President may be impeached and con-
victed for treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
The phrase "high misdemeanors" is and was understood to be a term
of art, deliberately broad and ambiguous in specific application, but
clearly embracing serious violations of public trust by officers of the
government, including such acts as failure or refusal to execute faith-
fully the laws or any type of misconduct in office which constitutes an
abuse of its authority or prerogatives.
There is simply no acceptable basis to argue that the impeachment
provision of the Constitution restricts impeachment to acts in viola-
tion of the criminal laws. There is no support for this contention in
the history of English impeachments, the understanding of the makers
of the Constitution, or in the precedents in our own history.44
42. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4.
43. Id. art 1, § 3, cl. 7.
44. Blackstone has been cited for the proposition that "impeachment must rest upon
a violation of existing criminal law." BERGER at 55. Blackstone's observation would be
of great significance as an indication of the intention of the framers of the Constitution,
but the fact is that Blackstone defined "high misdemeanors," the Constitutional phrase,
as "misprisions," "such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly
bordering thereon." He defined "the first and principal" of this category of"misprisions"
or "high misdemeanors" as "the mal-administration [sic] of such high officers, as are
in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method of parliamen-
tary impeachment ...... 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 119-21 (14th ed. 1803).
Blackstone's views are consistent with English practice and precedent with respect to
the grounds for impeachment.
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In the leisurely days of 1787, when the House of Representatives
and the Senate were small bodies with little to do, impeachment may
have been a practical procedure for removing a President from office.
It is now staggering to contemplate the amount of time that a Senate
trial of impeachment charges will require, the inevitable fury that it
will provoke, and the divisions and hostilities that it will engender. In-
escapable as an impeachment trial may be in the present situation, its
dimensions-the disruption that it has caused and will cause-are
disconcerting; and I submit that we must find a better way to supply the
ultimate remedy for removing a President from office.
We must find a method that permits us to terminate a President's
tenure which is not so easy and facile that he can be deposed because
of political disagreement or policy opposition. We must find a way
that preserves our system of conflict, tension, advocacy and consensus
between the Congress and the President, and does not destroy it by
permitting the Congress to terminate a President's tenure because of
disagreement with him. The parliamentary system, in my opinion, is
not suitable to our temperament. We do not seek a new constitutional
balance. We seek to restore our constitutional balance: The balance
that the Founding Fathers created and which has served us so well.
At the same time, we cannot, we should not have as our only
choices the alternatives of enduring for four long years a President
who has violated his trust and who threatens essential national values,
or subjecting the Nation to the protracted, complex and destructive
ordeal of impeachment proceedings.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
I believe, then, that we are in need of some fundamental changes to
restore the balance in our system, to protect our political democracy,
and to safeguard our individual rights and liberties. I think we should
consider the following:
First: While we have no present option except to proceed with the
pending impeachment proceedings (unless the President decides to re-
sign), we should provide an alternative method. Representative Edith
Green of Oregon has proposed a joint resolution to amend the Consti-
tution which seems to me to be well designed for this purpose. 45 It
45. H.R.J. Res. 708, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973): see also H.R.J. Res. 547, 93d
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provides that a special election shall be called for President and Vice
President if the House and Senate, by two-thirds vote of each, shall
enact a resolution that the President has failed or refused faithfully to
execute the laws, or has willfully exceeded his powers, or has caused
or willfully permitted the rights of citizens to be trespassed upon. The
special election would be federally financed and would be held within
90 days; and the incumbent President and Vice President would be
eligible to be candidates.
This plan has the following virtues: It avoids the procedural diffi-
culties of impeachment. Its implications are not as degrading-it does
not bar the President from re-election, nor does it necessarily imply
the devastating moral judgment which is implicit in impeachment,
that is, the disqualification of the President from any future position
of public honor or trust. It does not require a trial of the President
on charges, but it limits the House and Senate by requiring that they
find specific and limited grounds for calling the special election. It makes
possible a complete change in executive leadership, rather than merely
a shift from the President to the Vice President. And finally, it remits
the ultimate judgment as to whether the President is to continue in
office to the people-which is where it belongs.
The Green resolution does not eliminate the Founding Fathers' idea
of a fixed term for the President' to assure his independence of the
Congress and to carry out the basic constitutional idea that he would
act as a check upon the Congress and would balance congressional
power. It retains the American principle of fragmented power-of a
government by consensus, conflict, advocacy and tension. It does not
adopt the unitary parliamentary system. But it would provide a mech-
anism which would operate in extreme situations; and more impor-
tantly, it would provide a constant restraint upon the President,
warning him that extreme misconduct may result in his having to
submit to a special election.
Second: I believe that we should reconsider the twenty-second
amendment. It is a good tradition that Presidents should not serve
more than two terms;46 but it is a dubious constitutional prohibition.
It is bad psychology: There is a vast difference between the effect
Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) (Representative Bingham) and H.RJ. Res. 697, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973) (Representative Obey).
46. Thirty Presidents held the office prior to Franklin D. Roosevelt. None of them
sought a third term.
1007
Washington Law Review
upon an incumbent President of a constitutional prohibition and of a
voluntary decision that he will not run again. Presidents are people;
essentially, they are just people; and the message of the twenty-second
amendment, that they face the end of the road and their last chance
to achieve their goals, can be an incitement to the extreme and willful
use of power.
Third: We should amend the provisions of the twenty-fifth amend-
ment relating to filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
and we should redefine the office and functions of the Vice President.
The twenty-fifth amendment provides that when the office of Vice
President is vacant because of death or resignation, the President
nominates his successor who takes office upon approval by a majority
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This means that a per-
son who has not been elected by the people of the Nation may become
President, and it is possible that he may serve as such for more than
three years, without having obtained a mandate from the people. It
seems obvious to me that this is inconsistent with our basic democratic
principles, and that if the Vice Presidential office becomes vacant, his
successor should be elected in a special election.
Fourth: For somewhat the same reasons, I submit that we should
revise the provisions of our Constitution with respect to the Vice Pres-
ident. Vice Presidents are not really chosen by the voters. They are
selected by the Presidential candidates; they are elected merely as an
appendange to the people's vote for President.
We should amend the Constitution in recognition of this reality,
and provide that a Vice President, succeeding to the office of the Pres-
ident, should hold that office only until a President is selected by the
voters in a special election to be held within 90 days. This would also
go a long way towards reducing the significance of the present, and I
think, unavoidable, inadequacies of the methods of the selection of
Vice Presidential candidates, which were dramatized so vividly and
sadly in the Eagleton incident at the last Democratic Convention.
I would also change the constitutional provisions concerning the
duties of the Vice President. He should not preside at the sessions of
the Senate, as the Constitution now provides. He should be an execu-
tive official entirely; and he should be available for such full-time ex-
ecutive responsibilities as the President may delegate to him, including
the responsibility of head of a department such as the Department of
State. Hopefully, this would permit the President to delegate some of
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his excessive duties to the Vice President-and it would also make it
possible to give the Vice President some useful work to do.
Fifth and finally: It is somewhat unrealistic to expect that Presi-
dents will not invade the province of Congress unless Congress is
effectively doing its job. The Congress simply must face up to its res-
ponsibilities and must put its house in order. Public confidence in the
Congress is at a low ebb-and with some justification. Congress must
redefine its mission so as to make it practical and manageable; it must
legislate and appropriate in broad terms; it must delegate responsibility
for details; it must meticulously require the executive agencies to ac-
count for their administration, but it must not intervene in their speci-
fic decisions; and it must reorganize its machinery and its procedures
so that it can do its job.
A model, in a very difficult area, of constructive congressional ac-
tion to preserve its authority but at the same time to permit effective
government action, is available in the recently enacted War Powers
Resolution.
In November 1973, the Congress enacted the "War Powers Resolu-
tion," which had been originated by Senator Javits. 47 It enacted this
resolution over President Nix5n's veto. The operative part of this reso-
lution requires that, in any instance where armed forces are intro-
duced, the President shall report to Congress within 48 hours,
and that he shall terminate the use of United States forces in that situ-
ation within 60 days unless Congress otherwise provides.
This resolution is strong medicine. It warns the President that pro-
longed secrecy of military operations and studied exclusion of the
Congress from participation in military decisions, such as we experi-
enced in Laos and Cambodia, are not permissible. At the same time, it
recognizes the reality that the Nation may be faced with situations
where armed intervention is essential, and that only the President is in
a position to act speedily; and it carefully preserves the ultimate con-
trol of the Congress. 48
Another kind of example of the restructuring that is essential is pre-
sented in some of the impoundment bills presently under considera-
tion by the Congress. 49 Congress has and must exercise the appropria-
47. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
48. Cf. the laws empowering the President to use military forces to suppress in-
surrection, domestic violence, etc., 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34 (1970).
49. See, e.g., S. 373, H.R. 7130, H.R. 8480, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 3034,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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tion power. The President may not refuse to expend appropriated
funds, unless Congress has so authorized. But situations arise after
Congress has acted, in which changed conditions or circumstances
require reconsideration of appropriations. Present statutory provisions
to permit the President to act in these circumstances are inadequate.
Obviously, the Congress should enact an appropriate measure to
achieve this result, for example, by enabling the President to suspend
the expenditure of appropriated funds for a limited period during
which he will request the Congress to reconsider.
VII. CONCLUSION: A TIMELY WARNING
In conclusion, I ask that you consider my thesis: The fantastic events
that we label Watergate have profoundly shocked us. They would
have been shocking if they had involved only the President's political
party, or only a committee which he authorized to work for his re-
election. The participation of the President's White House staff and
close associates made them a calamity. And the possibility of the Pres-
ident's personal involvement made the events deeply traumatic-a
national disaster.
But Watergate was more than a series of incredible assaults upon
our political process; it was more than a series of patently lawless acts
of a base, criminal nature. Watergate was the ugly excrescence of a
theory of government which asserts the supremacy of the Presidency
over the Congress and the law of the land. It makes little difference
whether the theory was the President's or his associates'. It makes little
difference whether the theory was conscious or articulated, or whether
it is merely the unifying principle from which the various acts
emerged.
This is an intolerable theory for a democratic society. Some years
ago, Richard Nixon was a leader in combatting the alleged subversion
of our institutions by those who, he said, advocated a foreign ide-
ology; but foreign ideologies are not the only danger-and not the
greatest danger-to our Constitution and our political democracy.
Watergate was the ugly, dreadful face of a theory which embraced
the idea of a Presidency overriding congressional laws that conflicted
with the President's conclusions as to the national interest, a Presi-
dency inducing or tolerating lawlessness to promote its objectives, a
Presidency immune from court processes and congressional inquiry.
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We must remember this coupling of Watergate and political theory.
We must remember that we can be reasonably confident of avoiding
Watergate's criminal assaults upon our basic liberties only if we pre-
serve our political democracy. Freedom is indivisible. If we permit a
President to override the political restraints of our Constitution, to
overrule the Congress, to ride roughshod over the limits upon his
powers to govern which are prescribed by our Constitution, we invite
a Presidency which may also ride roughshod over the sanctity of our
homes and the privacy of our persons.
By the grace of God and good fortune, we have been saved-this
time. If we are to avoid these dangers in the future, we must do more
than punish those who participated in the current assaults upon us.
We must restore the balance that our Constitution designed; and to do
that, we must, I submit, revitalize the machinery of our government.
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